Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1986

Ben K. Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain Health Care,
LDS Hospital : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Charles W. Dahlquist; Attorney for Respondent.
Matt Biljanic; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain Health Care, No. 860076.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/820

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

BRIEF

ITAH
OCUMENT
;FU

0
)OCKET NO. 7 > k ° p ? ' t o

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BEN K. HOOPIIAINA,
Appellant,
vs.

8bocnb-CA

INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE,
dba LDS HOSPITAL, and
JANE DOE,

Case No. 20310

Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the Judgment of the Third
District Court for Salt Lake County
Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge

MATT BILJANIC
Attorney for Appellant
7355 South 9th East
Midvale, Utah 84047
CHARLES W. DAHLQUIST II
Attorney for Respondent
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

~E
b L

T-

MAR 'iutfo

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BEN K. HOOPIIAINA,
Appellant,
vs.
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE,
dba LDS HOSPITAL, and
JANE DOE,

Case No. 20310

Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the Judgment of the Third
District Court for Salt Lake County
Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge

MATT BILJANIC
Attorney for Appellant
7355 South 9th East
Midvale, Utah 84047
CHARLES W. DAHLQUIST II
Attorney for Respondent
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
T a b l e of A u t h o r i t i e s

i

Statutes

ii

Statement of Issues Presented on Appeal. .

iii

Statement of the Case

1,2

Summary of Arguments

3

Arguments
Point I

4,5,6,7,8,9

Point II

9,10,11

Point III

11,12

Point IV

12,13

Conclusions

14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Bullock v. Desert Dodge Truck Center, Inc.
354 P.2d 559

7

Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harver
17 Utah 2d 420, 431 P. 2d 807

8

Corbridge v. M. Morrin and Sons, Inc.
19 Utah 2d 409, 432 P. 2d 41

8

Farrow v. Health Services Corp.
604 P. 2d 474

6

Lab v. Hall
200 So. 2d 556

8

Preston v. Lamb
20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P. 2d 1021

8

Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guar.
Ins. Under.
16 Utah 2d 211, 398 P. 2d 685

7,9

Rich v. McGovern
551 P.2d 1266

5

Singleton v. Alexander
19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P. 2d 126
Rule 56 (c) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

4,8
ii

Rule 56 (d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

ii

Rule 56 (e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

ii

Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure .

5

6 Moore Federal Practice, 156.17(42)

8

Utah Hospital Rules and Regulations, Medical
Records Department §V8a (1977 Revision)

i

13

STATUTES
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
....The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.
Rule 56(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
If on motion under this Rule judgment is not rendered
upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the
motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence
before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable
ascertain what material facts are actually and in good
faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order
specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount
of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and
directing such further proceedings in the action as are
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified
shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be
conducted accordingly.
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant
is competent to testify to the matters stated therein....

ii

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Genuine issues as to material facts existed and the lower
court erred in granting Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
Regarding Plaintiff's claim of battery no evidence was
presented by Defendant to support its Motion for Summary
Judgment; thus granting the Motion was in error.
The question of damages remains at issue since Defendant's
expert addressed only the question of permanent damages.
Denial of access to other patient's medical records was
error because divulging the information would not violate
confidentiality of patient.

iii

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BEN K. HOOPIIAINA,
Appellant,
vs.
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE,
dba LDS HOSPITAL, and
JANE DOE,

Case No. 20310

Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant initiated this action in the Third District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, praying for
Judgment against the Defendant for damages resulting from the
wrongful administration of drugs.

The Defendant gave the Plain-

tiff a drug or drugs that were intended for another patient.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Third District Court, the Honorable Dean E. Conder,
Judge presiding, entered its Order of Dismissal the 1st day of
October, 1984, granting the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing the Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice.

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 5, 1981, the Plaintiff was admitted to the
hospital known as Intermountain Health Care dba LDS Hospital
for evaluation, observation, care and treatment as a patient.
On the 9th day of January, 1981, Wilda K. Cruz, a
registered nurse employed by the Defendant hospital, administered
a single 200 mg. tablet of Quinidine to the Plaintiff.
Cruz Affidavit R).

(See

This drug was given in error to the Plain-

tiff and was ordered for a heart patient located in the same
room as Plaintiff.

(.See Plaintiff's Counter Affidavit paragraph

4 R).
The Plaintiff claims that he was given a drug prior
to 12:00 P.M. January 8, 1981, which drug made him ill. After
1:00 A.M. on January 9, 1981, he was given additional drugs.
(See Plaintiff's Counter Affidavit

).

The Plaintiff was to be released on January 9, 1981,
according to the Plaintiff's doctor.

After receiving the drug

Quinidine and whatever else was given to him on the evening of
January 8th and the morning of the 9th, he became ill. He
remained in the hospital until he was released January 12, 1981.

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Genuine issues as to material facts existed and the lower
court erred in granting Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

2.

Regarding Plaintiff's claim of battery no evidence was
presented by Defendant to support its Motion for Summary
Judgment; thus granting the Motion was in error.

3.

The question of damages remains at issue since Defendant's
expert addressed only the question of permanent damages.

4.

Denial of access

to other patient's medical records

was error because divulging the information would not
violate confidentiality of patient.

3

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THAT GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT EXISTED FOR THE LOWER
COURT AND THE GRANTING OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS ERROR.
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reads
in part as follows:
Pvulc 56(c).... The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.
It will be noted that a summary judgment can be granted
only when it is shown that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party also is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law under those facts.

The court cannot

consider the weight of testimony or the credibility of witnesses
in considering a motion for summary judgment.

The judge simply

determines that there is no disputed issue of material fact and
that as a matter of law a party should prevail.

Singleton v.

Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 126 (1967).
The purpose of the motion for summary judgment is to
provide a means for searching out the undisputed facts as shown
by the submissions to the court, i.e., the pleadings, depositions,
admissions and answers to interrogatories and documents; and if

4

on that basis the controversy can be settled as a matter of law,
that will save the time, trouble and expense of a trial.

Rich

v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 (1976).
The prominence of the comprehensive work Federal
Practice and Procedure by Barren and Holtzoff has been cited in
virtually every case construing the modern rules of civil procedure and has been cited with approval in this jurisdiction.
While this treatise deals with the federal rules, Rule 56 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is identical to the federal
rules.

Section 1234 at page 129 of this treatise states clearly

the appellant's assertion herein as follows:
It is sometimes said....that Rule 56 does not
permit "trial by affidavits11. The correct
principal which the epithet tends to conceal
is that affidavits may be used on a motion
for summary judgment, but that the court may
not resolve disputed fact issues by reference
to the affidavits. On a motion for summary
judgment the court cannot summarily try factual
issues. In ruling on the motion the court may
consider only facts which are not in dispute or
the dispute of which raises no substantial issue.
The motion should be granted only when all of the
facts entitling the moving party to judgment are
admitted or clearly established.
In the instant case, affidavits and interrogatories were
submitted by both Plaintiff and Defendant.

Judge Conder stated

in his memorandum decision that the basis for granting the Defendant's motion for summary judgment was the failure of the Plaintiff

5

to provide a medical doctor to testify as to causation.
randum Decision dated September 17, 1984 R.)

(Memo-

Thus, his decision

was not based on the requirement that there were no facts in
issue but on the competency of the affiant.
Rule 56(e) provides that M...affidavits shall be made
on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify as to the matters stated therein."
The affidavits of the Plaintiff (See Affidavits of Dr. Peat and
Nurse Cruz

R) addressed the issue of one dose of the drug

Quinidine which admittedly was given to Ben Hoopiiaina by mistake.
Mr. Hoopiiaina states in his counter affidavit (See Plaintiff's
counter affidavit

R) that he was given the medication on two

occasions and additionally was mistakenly given blood thinner.
Although Mr. Hoopiiaina is not competent to testify to the
medical effects of an improperly administered dose of Quinidine,
he is competent to testify to the fact that he was mistakenly
administered drugs on three occasions during a defined time
period.

Thus, there is a material fact in issue—the amount of

drugs administered in error to Mr. Hoopiiaina.
In Farrow v. Health Services Corp., 604 P.2d 474 (Utah
1979), a malpractice action, the basis for granting the Defendant's
motion for summary judgment was the fact that the Plaintiff could
not make a prima facie case at trial.
6

This court reversed the

ruling allowing the Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
It said the testimony of the nurse which showed that the
physician's 8:00 p.m. order for the immediate administration
of medication which was not administered until 10:00 p.m. gave
rise to an issue of a material fact precluding summary judgment.
This is similar to Mr. Hoopiiainafs situation; however, instead
cf having been given a drug at an improper time, he was given
an improper drug.
The contentions as to the facts of a party opposing a
motion for summary judgment should be considered in the light
most favorable to him, and only if it clearly appears that he
could not establish a right to recovery under the law should
such action be taken; any doubts which exist should be resolved
in favor of affording him the privilege of a trial. Reliable
Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guard. Ins. Under., 16 Utah 2d 211,
398 P.2d 685 (1965).

Such showing must preclude all reasonable

possibility that the loser could, if given a trial, produce
evidence which would reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor.
Bullock v. Desert Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 354 P.2d 559 (1960).
The Defendant in the instant case avers that one drug dosage was
given to the Plaintiff.

Mr. Hoopiiaina states that he was given

medication on three occasions; his contentions as to the facts
should be considered in the light most favorable to him.
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Ordinarily, questions of negligence may not be settled
on a motion for summary judgment, but summary judgment is a
proper method of eliminating a negligence case which has no
merit when there is no showing of Defendant's negligence.

Preston

v. Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P.2d 1021 (1968); Corbridge v.
M. Morrin and Sons, Inc., 19 Utah 2d 409, 432 P.2d 41 (1967).
When it comes to determining negligence, contributory negligence,
and causation, courts are not in such good position to make a
total determination for here enters a prerogative of the jury to
make a determination of its own, and that is: Did the conduct
of a party measure up to that of the reasonably prudent man, and,
if not, was it a proximate cause of the harm done?
Alexander, supra.

Singleton v.

This is particularly true in malpractice suits

where the attendant facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of
the movants and the showing of negligence is generally dependent
upon expert testimony as to the standard of care required and
observed.

6 Moore Federal Practice, §56.17(42), page 56-946;

Lab v. Hall, 200 So. 2d 556 (1967).
In Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harver, 17 Utah 2d
420, 431 P.2d 807 (1966), this court stated that a motion for
summary judgment is a "harsh measure".

The summary disposal of

a case serves a salutary purpose in avoiding the time, trouble and
expense of a trial when it is justified.

But unless it is clearly

so, there are other evils to be guarded against.
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A party with a

legitimate cause, but who is unable to afford an appeal, may
be turned away without his day in court; or, when an appeal is
taken, if a reversal results and a trial is ordered, the time,
trouble and expense is increased rather than diminished.

It

is to avoid these evils and to safeguard the right of access
to the courts for the enforcement of rights and the remedy of
wrongs by a trial, and by a jury if desired, that it is of such
importance that the court should take care to see that the
party adversely affected has a fair opportunity to present his
contentions against precipitate action which will deprive him
of that privilege.
Ins. Under., supra.

Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guar.
By granting the Defendant's motion for

summary judgment, Mr. Hoopiiaina was denied an opportunity to
present his contentions—was denied his day in court.

POINT II
THAT THE CLAIM OF BATTERY REMAINS IN CONTROVERSY
AND IT WAS THEREFORE IMPROPER FOR THE LOWER COURT
TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Under Rule 56(d), summary judgment can be rendered upon
less than the whole case.

By examining the pleadings and the

evidence before it, the court shall ascertain what material facts
exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are
actually in good faith controverted.
9

The court then shall direct

such further proceedings in the action as are just.

Rule 56(d)

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendant moved
for judgment in its favor on all claims asserted (See Motion for
Summary Judgment R. page 1).

In support of the motion, the

Defendant submitted affidavits of Wilda K. Cruz, R.N., and
Michael Alan Peat, Ph. D. (See Affidavits of Nurse Cruz and Dr.
Peat R) which both addressed the medical malpractice aspect of
this case, specifically the issue of administration of the drug
Quinidine.
As part of his Complaint, Mr. Hoopiiaina alleges in
paragraphs 33, 34, 57, and 58 (See Complaint R. pages 7 and 11)
an intentional, unpermitted and offensive contact, i.e., a
battery committed upon him by the Defendant.

No evidence re-

garding this claim was presented by the Defendant to support its
Motion for Summary Judgment.

This claim remains controverted,

and under Rule 56(d), it was improper for Judge Conder to dismiss
the entire case against the Defendant.

It was particularly

improper considering the fact that Judge Conder stated in his
memorandum decision (See Memorandum Decision dated September 17,
1984

R) that the basis for granting the Defendant's Motion for

Summary Judgment was the failure of the Plaintiff to provide a
medical doctor to testify as to causation.

Even if it were

appropriate to dismiss the medical malpractice claim, at minimum,
10

partial summary judgment would apply and the battery cause of
action should continue in the case.

POINT III
THAT THE QUESTION OF DAMAGES 'REMAINS AT ISSUE
SINCE DEFENDANT'S EXPERT ADDRESSED ONLY THE
QUESTION OF PERMANENT DAMAGES
Mr. Hoopiiaina entered the hospital January 5, 1981,
and was told by his doctor four days later that he would be
released the following day, January 9, 1981

(See Deposition of

Plaintiff R. pages 10, 13, 42, 43). He states that in preparation
for his release on January 9, release papers had been signed, his
family had delivered clothes to him to wear upon his release, and
he had made arrangements with his family to pick him up.
(Deposition R. page 43).
Mr. Hoopiiaina was given drugs by mistake on January 9,
became extremely ill, and as a result re>mained in the hospital
until January 12.

The treatment during the additional three days

of hospitalizaLion was given in response to Mr. Hoopiiainafs
adverse reaction to the improper drug admittedly administered by
the Defendant.

Mr. Hoopiiaina!s hospital bill included the

expenses of three additional days1 room charges, medication and
treatment given to counteract the effects of the improper drug,
and the approximate $500 expense of a portable oxygen unit Mr.
Hoopiiaina was required to purchase to support his breathing
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upon his release.
In his Affidavit (Affidavit of Michael Allan Peat,
Ph.D., R. page 3), the Defendant's expert witness states that
it is his professional opinion that a single dose of Quinidine
did not cause the permanent pulmonary and cardiovascular problems
and related difficulties suffered by Mr, Hoopiiaina.

Nowhere

has the issue of the specific monetary damages suffered by Mr.
Hoopiiaina been dealt with.
It is unconscionable for the Defendant to admit improperly administering a drug to Mr. Hoopiiaina and then require
him to bear the expenses of additional hospitalization, treatment,
and equipment to counteract the mistake.

POINT IV
THAT DENIAL OF ACCESS TO OTHER PATIENT1S MEDICAL
RECORDS WAS ERROR BECAUSE DIVULGING THE INFORMATION
WOULD NOT VIOLATE CONFIDENTIALITY OF PATIENT
Defendant admitted that the Plaintiff was given a dose
of the drug Quinidine on January 9, 1981 (Affidavit of Wilda K.
Cruz, R.N.

R). The Plaintiff requested that the Defendant

divulge information contained in the record of the patient who
was intended to receive the drug which was given to Mr. Hoopiiaina by mistake.

The Defendant refused to provide this inform-

ation, claiming it was irrelevant and confidential.

Plaintiff

applied to the court for the information through its Motion To
12

Compel.

The motion was denied (Order dated March, 1984 R).
The information contained in the other patient's

medical records is highly relevant to Mr. Hoopiiaina.

Although

the Defendant claims there was only one drug dosage given to the
Plaintiff, Mr. Hoopiiaina contends there was additional medication
administered.

The medical records of the other patient would

easily provide information as to the number of times drugs were
prescribed and administered and the strength of the doses.

This

would be extremely valuable information to Mr. Hoopiiaina in
determining the amount of drugs he was given in error.
Admittedly, hospital records are confidential.

Hospital

rules and regulations for the State of Utah require that:
A medical record shall be maintained for every
patient admitted for care in the hospital or
examined in the emergency room, and such records
shall be kept confidential.
Utah Hospital Rules and Regulations, Medical Records Department
§V8a (1977 Revision).

The Plaintiff was not interested in the

identity of the other patient, but was interested only in the
number of doses and the strength of the medication prescribed
and given for that patient.

The purpose of the hospital rules

and regulations is to protect the privacy of the patient.
Providing only the information regarding the quantity of drugs
would not violate the patient's privacy or the purpose of the
regulations but would provide valuable information to the
Plaintiff.
13

CONCLUSION
The lower court erred in granting the Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment because there was a genuine issue
of a material fact, the Motion for Summary Judgment was not
supported by evidence to extinguish Plaintiff1s battery claim,
only the issue of permanent damages was dealt with by Defendant,
and Plaintiff was improperly denied access to relevant medical
records.
A review of the facts shows that the lower court erroneously used the granting for summary judgment against the
Plaintiff as a substitute for the trial of disputed issues
between the parties.

For this reason the order of dismissal

should be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J/_ day of

flfai£j{,

1985,

MATT BILJANIC

Attorney for
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